The Unhandy Logistics of Hand Counts

Fear of technology is like any other phobia: the roots of it are grounded in reality, but the expression of the fear ranges from fantasy thinking to conspiracy theorists with an appetite for destruction. The recent push for hand-counted paper ballots (compared to hand-marked) is quickly becoming a repository for the fear of technology.

Small jurisdictions, or ones with a limited number of contests on the ballot, might find hand counting to be a feasible solution. It’s a much different story for mid-to-large sized jurisdictions. Here are just 9 of the reasons why: 

1. States have a deadline by which in-person ballots must be returned to the election office. Hand counting ballots at the precinct isn’t as simple as taking ballots out of the box and counting the main race. Before counting can begin, poll workers must close the polls, repack all the election equipment and voting booths, and ensure they have accounted for all the ballots on location. 

2. Bear in mind that if there is only manual counting by humans, there wouldn’t be ballot scanners in operation, so there is no printout to verify how many ballots are actually in the ballot box. Determining that number has to be done manually by matching ballot stubs up with the stub numbers recorded in the paper voter poll book (because certain groups pushing for hand counting also object to connected electronic poll books that can track in real time how many voters have come in to vote and have a corresponding paper ticket that can be attached to the ballot stub.) Once stubs and poll book info are correlated, inventory of the un-voted ballots can begin. Ballot accounting forms are relatively simple to complete, but once things like provisional ballots are factored in, the math grows more detailed. 

3. Speaking of provisional ballots, those can’t be adjudicated at the polling place, because there is no way for poll workers to verify the voter’s reason for needing a provisional ballot. Those must be inventoried separately, secured for transport to the election office as soon as possible for the canvassing board to review, and, if necessary, notify the voter before the provisional eligibility deadline has expired.

4. After provisional ballots are secured, if the election is a partisan primary, ballots need to be separated by party, and if it’s a split precinct, then by precinct as well. (A “Vote Center” style model would further require separating ballots into dozens of stacks for each individual precinct.)

5. In reading here, have you noticed that we haven’t even started to determine the results of the election? The inventory and ballot accounting paperwork can take anywhere from 15-45 minutes, with electronic poll books and ballot scanners. Even the most indefatigable election worker has now worked a 12-14 hour day, and they have more work to complete. This also begins to create staffing capacity issues. For example, who is keeping an eye on the election supplies once the counting starts? Bringing in teams of replacements creates a break in the chain of custody, and in the chaos of Election Night, it’s difficult to keep track of who has authorized access.

6. Counting ballots can be done at the polling place, or the main election office. Counting at a central location requires transporting hundreds or thousands of boxes of un-tabulated voted ballots anywhere from 1 mile to several hundred miles depending on the jurisdiction. This also adds another change in custody that absolutely requires documentation in order to ensure ballot security. This also increases the risk of something catastrophic happening to the uncounted cargo, potentially tempting would-be interceptors. Ballots transported by truck could be mired in traffic for hours, violating the return deadline. Thinking about how LA County, CA does this, ballots transported by helicopter could experience equipment problems (or worse), or be grounded on a helipad until air traffic control clears them for takeoff. 

7. Counting at the polling place, while less likely to involve a potential NTSB investigation if something goes horribly wrong, is more likely to attract people who are willing to do anything to stall the counting process and/or interfere with the security of the boxes of ballots in the process of being counted, particularly if the tallies are called out randomly as updates. 

8. Adding to the complexity is the question, “How many contests are on the ballot?” Los Angeles County has had over 40 contests and 150 candidates on some of their recent ballots. Should every race on the ballot get counted at the polling place? If so, that’s large blocks of hours worth of counting for an already exhausted team. If only select races are hand counted, do the candidates in the non hand counted contests have a legitimate grievance because some races were prioritized over others? How are disputes over voter intent to be resolved? Are there transparent procedures in place for teams to cross-check each other’s accounting? 

9. How do the precinct results get reported to the office accurately? Calling in the results by telephone might be the only reporting option, and a hundred precincts dialing the same number could mean a lot of frustration and busy signals. 

These are questions that must be completely answered, well documented, and made public long before the election takes place.

It's worth noting, to be clear, that we (and especially those on our team who are veteran elections professionals) are not per-se “anti-handcount.” We suspect voters trust the process just fine when they have a way to determine that their vote was counted. Vote By Mail ballots have ballot tracking software that documents each step of the process. At a polling place, ballot scanners display a message that the ballot was successfully counted. Hand counting doesn’t offer that instant reassurance to the voter. 

Does any of this make sense from a logistics, security, or financial standpoint? At OSET Institute and The TrustTheVote® Project, we believe there is a resolution that can bring everyone, from voters to election officials, together in agreement and our position can be summarized in five points: 

1. Rapid, accurate and trustworthy vote counts require both machines and people.

2. Machines can be rapid and accurate, but cannot be fully trustworthy because there are always technology issues—glitches, malfunctions, and yes, claims of compromise.

3. People are required to cross-check the work of ballot counting machines, selecting random samples of ballots, and hand-counting the selected ballots to determine if machine counts had errors that could yield an incorrect election result.

4. Hand counting all ballots also poses insider threats and trust issues that led to the first and original use of mechanical vote-casting machines.

5. Machine counts are necessary, but not sufficient; people doing counting to cross-check is necessary as well.

People have an unfortunate habit of becoming nostalgic over things they weren’t that happy with when they were actually happening—or weren’t alive to witness in the first place. Movies and books paint beautiful narratives about the scratching of quill pens on parchment, the grand ball gowns swirling around, dancing all night at royal parties, or the majesty of ancient cathedrals. 

However, I’m pretty certain that no one wants to go back to dipping quill pens in inkwells, washing clothes on a washboard using caustic tallow soap, inflexible single lasted shoes, or the Spanish Inquisition.

Here’s my takeaway: Technology is not the enemy. It’s a tool. Sure, technology can be weaponized to maim and kill and expedite subjugation and suffering. Technology can also be used to fight disease, create amazing tools, send us into space (and back), and protect elections.

–Genya Coulter